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A Distributed Auction Algorithm for the Assignment Problem
Michael M. Zavlanos, Leonid Spesivtsev and George J. Pappas
Abstract—The assignment problem constitutes one of the
fundamental problems in the context of linear programming.
Besides its theoretical significance, its frequent appearance in
the areas of distributed control and facility allocation, where
the problems’ size and the cost for global computation and
information can be highly prohibitive, gives rise to the need for
local solutions that dynamically assign distinct agents to distinct
tasks, while maximizing the total assignment benefit. In this
paper, we consider the linear assignment problem in the context
of networked systems, where the main challenge is dealing with
the lack of global information due to the limited communication
capabilities of the agents. We address this challenge by means
of a distributed auction algorithm, where the agents are able
to bid for the task to which they wish to be assigned. The
desired assignment relies on an appropriate selection of bids
that determine the prices of the tasks and render them more
or less attractive for the agents to bid for. Up to date pricing
information, necessary for accurate bidding, can be obtained in
a multi-hop fashion by means of local communication between
adjacent agents. Our algorithm is an extension to the parallel
auction algorithm proposed by Bertsekas et al to the case where
only local information is available and it is shown to always
converge to an assignment that maximizes the total assignment
benefit within a linear approximation of the optimal one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given two sets consisting of agents and tasks, respectively,
the linear assignment problem searches for a one-to-one
matching between the agents and the tasks so that the total
assignment benefit is maximized. In this paper, we investigate
the linear assignment problem in the context of networked
systems, where computation and memory resources are dis-
tributed among a set of agents with limited communication
capabilities seeking an assignment with a desired set of tasks.
The linear assignment problem is fundamental in combina-
torial optimization due to its underlying linear programming
structure. It can be shown that the well known class of
linear network flow problems can be reduced to the linear
assignment problem by an appropriate transformation [1].
Moreover, the linear assignment problem often appears as a
subproblem in more complex problems such as the travel-
ing salesman problem [2]. Besides, however, its theoretical
significance, equally important is its wide applicability in
research areas ranging from facility allocation to distributed
robotics. In distributed robotics, in particular, the linear
assignment problem has recently received considerable at-
tention due to applications involving task or target allocation
[3]–[6] and formation stabilization [7]–[16].
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Due to its theoretical and practical significance, various
techniques have been proposed for obtaining an optimal
solution. Most rely on iterative improvement of some cost
function [17]–[20], while Kuhn’s Hungarian algorithm [21]
was the first method specifically designed for that problem.
All above techniques require a single central processor that
handles all computation and information in the system. The
need, however, for more efficient and reliable algorithms, has
recently lead to decentralized approaches, where computation
and ideally also information is distributed among multiple
parallel processing units. One such approach is the auction
algorithm proposed in [22], [23] that based on an appropriate
choice of bids, determines the prices of the tasks and
renders them more or less attractive for the agents to bid
for. Although, the assignment benefit does not necessarily
increase monotonically, it can be shown that eventually an
optimal assignment is discovered.
Despite the fact that computation in the auction algorithm
[23] is distributed over multiple agents, a shared memory
repository containing the task prices, where all agents have
access, is required. This practically leads to a complete
communication topology. In the case of networked sys-
tems, however, consisting of possibly mobile agents with
power constraints and limited communication capabilities,
the underlying network topologies are in principle dynamic
and not complete. Hence, we need to extend the parallel
auction algorithm proposed in [23], to the case where only
local communication between adjacent agents is available.
As in [23], the assignment process relies on an appropriate
selection of bids that determine the task prices, however, in
the current framework every agent locally stores, possibly
outdated, estimates of the task prices, which it updates
using nearest neighbor agreement protocols. We show that
the network topology may affect the algorithm performance
which, however, is guaranteed to converge to an assignment
with total assignment benefit within a linear approximation
of the optimal one. We also argue that in mobile robotics
applications, where neither shared memory nor central com-
putation is available, our approach is more natural.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we define the linear assignment problem in the context
of networked systems, while in Section III we propose a
distributed auction algorithm for the assignment problem and
discuss its convergence and complexity properties. Finally, in
Section IV, we illustrate our approach for different network
topologies and discuss the resulting performance.
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Shared Memory
Networked System
Fig. 1. Shared memory (left) versus networked (right) systems. Both
systems consist of parallel independent processing units (agents) resulting
in asynchronous decentralized computation. Information, however, in shared
memory systems is global due to a central memory repository contain-
ing the system’s global variables where all agents have read and write
access, whereas in networked systems is local due to the agents’ local
memory (where local variables are stored) and their limited communication
capabilities that allow information exchange with nearest neighbors only.
Furthermore, shared memory systems are typically associated with static
communication topologies, while communication topologies in the case of
networked systems can, in general, be dynamic.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a network of n agents with integrated wireless
communication capabilities and denote by (i, j) a com-
munication link between agents i and j. We assume that
communication links between the agents can be enabled and
disabled in time, due to either agent mobility, or power
constraints. Such networks give rise to the notion of a
dynamic graph G(t) = (V, E(t)), where V = {1, . . . , n}
consists the set of vertices indexed by the set of agents and
E(t) = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ V} denotes a time varying set of links.
We assume bidirectional communication links among the
agents and so (i, j) ∈ E(t) if and only if (j, i) ∈ E(t). Such
graphs are called undirected and consist the main focus of
this paper. Any vertices i and j of an undirected graph G(t)
that are joined by a link (i, j) ∈ E(t), are called adjacent or
neighbors at time t. Hence, we can define the set of neighbors
of agent i at time t, by Ni(t) = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E(t)}.
A topological invariant of graphs that is of great importance
for the purposes of this work is graph connectivity.
Definition 2.1 (Graph Connectivity): We say that a dy-
namic graph G(t) is connected at time t if there exists a
path, i.e., a sequence of distinct vertices such that consecutive
vertices are adjacent, between any two vertices in G(t).
Given the dynamic network G(t) consisting of n agents
described above, let m ≥ n denote a number of tasks
that need to be accomplished by the agents and define
the injective map α : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m} such that
α(i) = j if and only if task j has been assigned to agent i.
Denote, further, by βij ∈ R the benefit of assigning task j
to agent i. This can be a function of the distance that agent
i needs to travel in order to acquire task j, the power that is
required to fulfill task j, or even the time required to fulfill
that task. Then, the objective investigated in this paper can
be stated as follows.
Problem 1 (Distributed Assignment): Given a connected
in time dynamic network G(t) consisting of n agents, m ≥ n
tasks and a set of nm benefits βij associated with assigning
agent i to task j, determine distributed control laws that
assign distinct agents to distinct tasks, such that the total
assignment benefit
∑n
i=1 βiα(i) is maximized.
Since, the assignment of the agents to tasks is not provided
a priori, it needs to be determined dynamically. We achieve
this goal by defining a distributed market where the agents
are able to bid for the task to which they wish to be
assigned. Unlike prior work that assumes either a single
central auctioneer [22] or multiple parallel processing units
(corresponding to the agents) composed in an asynchronous
shared memory system with global information [23], we
propose a distributed control framework, where every agent
independently and using only local information, is able to
determine a task to be assigned to (Fig. 1). The desired
assignment relies on an appropriate selection of bids that
determine the prices of the tasks and render them more or
less attractive for the agents to bid for. Accurate pricing in-
formation, necessary for correct bidding, can be obtained in a
multi-hop fashion by means of local communication between
adjacent agents. Our approach is described in Section III and
consists an extension to the parallel auction algorithm [23],
proposed by Bertsekas et al, to the case where only local
information is available.
III. DISTRIBUTED AUCTION ALGORITHM
As in [22], let every task j have a price pj(t) ≥ 0 at
time t, which every agent i that gets assigned to it has to
pay. Then, the net value of task j for agent i is βij − pj(t)
and every agent i would like to be assigned to a task j that
provides it with a maximum net value
βij − pj(t) = max
1≤k≤m
{βik − pk(t)}. (1)
If (1) is satisfied for all agents i we say that the assign-
ment and the set of prices are at equilibrium. Equilibrium
assignments are fundamental in the study of the assignment
problem since, they correspond to maximum total benefit,
while the corresponding sets of prices solve the associated
dual optimization problem [24].
As shown in [22], designing a market that guarantees an
equilibrium assignment is not straightforward, due to the
possibility of cycles in the algorithm, resulting from several
agents requesting to be assigned to a smaller number of
equally desirable tasks without, however, raising their prices.
For this, we employ the notion of an almost equilibrium
assignment and set of prices, introduced in [22]. This notion
of an equilibrium is motivated by real auctions, where
every bid for a task must raise its price by a minimum
positive increment and the agents must take risks to win their
preferred tasks. In particular, we define an almost equilibrium
assignment and set of prices at time t when the net value for
every agent i assigned to task j is within a constant ǫ > 0
of being maximal, i.e., when
βij − pj(t) ≥ max
1≤k≤m
{βik − pk(t)} − ǫ (2)
for all agents i. Condition (2) in the context of the auction
algorithm [22] is known as ǫ-complementary slackness and
for ǫ = 0 reduces to the ordinary complementary slackness
condition (1).
The rest of this section is devoted in describing a dis-
tributed auction algorithm over a dynamic network of agents
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Algorithm 1 Auction Iteration for Agent i
Require: An assignment αi(t) ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a set of
prices pij(t) ≥ 0 and highest bidders bij(t) ∈ N for all
tasks 1 ≤ j ≤ m;
1: Update the prices of all tasks and the corresponding
highest bidders by
pij(t+ 1) := maxk∈Ni(t){pij(t), pkj(t)} and
bij(t+ 1) := maxk∈argmaxz∈Ni(t){pij(t),pzj(t)}
{bkj(t)};
2: if piαi(t)(t) ≤ piαi(t)(t+1) and biαi(t)(t+1) 6= i then
3: Update the assignment by
αi(t+ 1) ∈ argmax1≤k≤m{βik − pik(t+ 1)};
4: Set biαi(t+1)(t + 1) := i and increase the price for
task αi(t+1) by piαi(t+1)(t+1) := piαi(t+1)(t)+γi,
where γi ≥ ǫ is according to equations (3)-(5);
5: else
6: Remain assigned to task αi(t), i.e., αi(t+1) := αi(t);
7: end if
and showing that it always converges to an almost equilib-
rium assignment. In particular, let G(t) denote a dynamic
network consisting of n agents and let αi(t) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
denote the assignment status of agent i at time t, such that
αi(t) = j if agent i is assigned to task j. Let further
pij(t) ≥ 0 denote the price that agent i needs to pay in
order to be assigned to task j at time t and bij(t) ∈ N
denote the largest-index bidder among the possibly multiple
(due to ties) highest bidders for task j at time t.1
Given the above notation, a single iteration of the dis-
tributed auction algorithm for agent i is described in Algo-
rithm 1. In particular, given a set of prices {pij(t)}
m
j=1 at time
t, an assignment αi(t) that currently provides agent i with the
best net value, i.e., αi(t) ∈ argmax1≤k≤m{βik−pik(t)}, and
a set of highest bidders with the largest index {bij(t)}
m
j=1,
such that biαi(t)(t) = i, agent i updates the prices and
highest bidders for all tasks j using local maximum-price
and maximum-index update protocols, respectively (line 1,
Alg. 1). Such updates guarantee that, for any sequence G(t)
of connected networks, every agent will eventually receive
the up-to-date maximum price
pj(t) , max
1≤k≤n
{pkj(t)}
of all tasks j as well as the corresponding highest bidders
with the largest index. In other words, although time delays
in the network due to multi-hop information propagation
may result in non-adjacent agents using outdated task prices
and bidding lower for expensive tasks, eventually up-to-date
information is received resulting in accurate bidding (Fig. 2).
The second and final step of an iteration of Algorithm 1
consists of checking whether the price piαi(t)(t) of the
current assignment αi(t) of agent i has been increased by
1Unlike shared memory systems where the global task prices pj(t) are
stored in a common memory repository to which all agents have access [23],
in the proposed networked system every agent i has local copies of the task
prices pij(t) which it updates using information from its neighbors (Fig. 1).
This lack of global information, may result in ties in the bids, for which a
tie breaking mechanism, captured by bij(t), needs to be introduced.
t0
piσ
pjσ
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
pkσ
i
j
k pkσ
pkσ
pkσ
ǫ ǫ
ǫ
ǫ
ǫ
piσ
ǫ
piσ
ǫ
pσ
pjσ
Fig. 2. Propagation of pricing information in a network of six agents.
Agents i, j and k desire to be assigned to task σ and bid for this task at
time instants t0 through t6 corresponding to consecutive communication
cycles. Assume that task σ is initially attractive for agents i and j and
it remains attractive for both at time t1 after they have exchanged prices
piσ(t0) and pjσ(t0), respectively. During the next communication cycle
(time t2), agent i receives pjσ(t1) from agent j and bids higher for task σ,
which is no longer attractive for agent j. At time t3 agent k is not yet aware
of the pricing sequence piσ(t0), piσ(t1) and piσ(t2) and initializes a low
bid for task σ. However, during subsequent time instants t4, t5 and t6, agent
k receives prices piσ(t0), piσ(t1) or piσ(t2), respectively, and increases its
bid for task σ. Note that lack of global pricing information results in agent
k initially placing unreasonably low bids. However, eventually a correct bid
will be placed due to the connected network structure.
other agents in the network or whether a larger-indexed agent
has placed an equal bid, in which case there is a tie for task
αi(t) (line 2, Alg. 1).
2 If any of the previous statements is
true, assignment αi(t) may no longer be at equilibrium and
agent i needs to select a new assignment αi(t + 1) using
the updated prices (line 3, Alg. 1) and increase the price
piαi(t+1) of this task by
γi , vi − wi + ǫ, (3)
where
vi , max
1≤j≤m
{βij − pij(t)} (4)
corresponds to the best net value available to agent i,
wi , max
j 6=αi(t+1)
{βij − pij(t)} (5)
corresponds to the second best net value available to agent
i and ǫ > 0 indicates a minimum bid increment (line 4,
Alg. 1). Clearly,
max
1≤j≤m
{βij − pij(t+ 1)}− ǫ ≤ βiαi(t+1) − piαi(t+1)(t+ 1),
which implies that the new assignment and set of prices are
almost at equilibrium, with respect to the partial knowledge
of prices that agent i has. Note that, with respect to this
partial knowledge of prices, piαi(t+1)(t + 1) is now the
highest price for task αi(t+1) and so agent i can also update
biαi(t+1)(t + 1), accordingly (line 4, Alg. 1). Note, finally,
that Algorithm 1 does not require any particular initialization
of the prices pij(0). In other words, the necessary almost at
2Note that if piαi(t)(t) < piαi(t)(t+1) then clearly biαi(t)(t+1) 6= i.
Hence, the condition biαi(t)(t+1) 6= i only affects ties on the prices, where
it acts as a tie breaker due to the maximum-index update rule (line 1, Alg. 1).
Clearly, the largest-index agent wins all ties.
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equilibrium initial assignment αi(0) and corresponding set of
highest bidders bij(0), with biαi(0)(0) = i, can be generated
using any set of initial prices.
Hence, we can define the distributed auction algorithm
for the assignment problem by the integration of n copies of
Algorithm 1 run by each one of the agents in the network.
The following result shows that the proposed algorithm
always terminates with a correct assignment.
Proposition 3.1: Given a connected in time dynamic net-
work G(t) consisting of n agents and a set of m ≥ n
tasks, the distributed auction algorithm terminates in a finite
number of iterations with an assignment and a set of prices
that are almost at equilibrium.
Proof: Note first that, due to the networked structure of
the system which imposes multi-hop communication patterns
among the agents, for every task and every time instant
there exist agents that are not yet informed of its actual
price and others that are (Fig. 2). We call these agents
uninformed and informed, respectively, and note that due to
the maximum-price update rule and the connected structure
of the network, every uninformed agent becomes informed
in a finite number of communication cycles that depends
on its distance (in number of links) to the closest informed
agent.3 This implies that uninformed agents may be placing
low bids for expensive tasks, however, eventually they will
become informed and bid correctly for an attractive task.
With this observation, we can disregard all bids made by
uninformed agents (which are finite due to the finite number
of communication cycles until an agent becomes informed)
and only consider bids by informed agents that increase the
actual price of every task. Hence, we only need to show that
every task can only receive a finite number of such bids.
Our argument is along the lines of [22]: Observe that
every informed agent that is assigned to a task that has
already received a bid, attains the maximum possible net
value from this assignment. The reason for this is that the
maximum net value is attained by any informed agent just
after acquiring the task and remains maximum for as long
as the agent remains informed and holds the task (since
the other task prices can not decrease in the course of the
algorithm). Note also that whenever m bids are placed for
a task by any number of informed agents, its price must
increase by at least mǫ. Thus, for sufficiently large m, the
task will become expensive enough to be considered as less
attractive compared to other tasks that have not yet received
any bids. It follows that there is a limited number of bids
that any task can receive by informed agents, while there still
exist tasks that have not yet received any bids. Therefore, the
auction will continue until all tasks have received at least
one bid by an informed agent (at which point all agents are
informed) and will terminate with all agents obtaining their
maximum possible net value.
Observe that Theorem 3.3 also provides a termination
condition for the distributed auction algorithm, namely that
3Note that the number of communication cycles is finite since, as it will
be shown next, there can not exist informed agents that continuously bid
for the same task.
every task should have received at least one bid. This condi-
tion clearly holds when the task prices stop changing and in
order to account for the multi-hop information propagation
in the network, we may define termination of the algorithm
as the time instant when the task prices for all agents remain
unchanged for at least ∆ communication rounds, where
∆ ≤ n − 1 indicates the maximum network diameter, i.e.,
the maximum length path between any two agents in the
network. The following result provides an upper bound on
the number of iterations of the distributed auction algorithm.
Proposition 3.2: The distributed auction algorithm termi-
nates in O
(
∆n2⌈maxi,j{βij}−mini,j{βij}
ǫ
⌉
)
iterations.
Proof: In order to maximize the total number of
iterations of the algorithm, we construct a worst case scenario
where all agents persistently place minimum bid increments
of size ǫ > 0 on every single task (until it is no longer
attractive), delaying thus the assignment process. To achieve
this goal, let δ > 0 and Mj > 0, j = 1, . . . ,m, such that
the benefits βij are distributed according to


max
1≤i≤n
{βij} − min
1≤i≤n
{βij} < δ
min
1≤i≤n
{βij} − max
1≤i≤n
{βi(j−1)} = Mj
,
for all j = 1 . . . ,m. Then, task n is initially the most
attractive for all agents and for sufficiently small δ > 0 it
will remain so until its price is increased by at least Mn.
This requires at least ⌈Mn
ǫ
⌉ bids on that task by every agent
and results in a total of n⌈Mn
ǫ
⌉ iterations of the algorithm.
Once the price of task n has been increased by at least
Mn, task n− 1 becomes also attractive and starts receiving
bids by the agents. Clearly, tasks n and n − 1 remain the
only attractive tasks for at least 2⌈Mn−1
ǫ
⌉ more iterations of
the algorithm by every one of the n agents, resulting in an
increase in their price by at least Mn−1 and a total number
of 2n⌈Mn−1
ǫ
⌉ iterations. Similarly, the next task to become
attractive and start receiving bids is task n−2 and as before,
tasks n, n−1 and n−2 remain the only attractive tasks for at
least 3n⌈Mn−2
ǫ
⌉ more iterations of the algorithm. Proceeding
in the same fashion and summing up the total numbers of
iterations for each stage of the assignment process, we get
n
n∑
j=1
j
⌈Mn−j+1
ǫ
⌉
≤ n2
⌈maxi,j{βij} −mini,j{βij}
ǫ
⌉
.
Observe that this number of iterations needs to be aug-
mented by the number of communication rounds required
to propagate each bid in the network. In the worst case,
this requires ∆ communication rounds for every iteration
of the algorithm, which completes the proof. Note that,
the proposed scenario forces the agents to keep bidding on
specific tasks and hence, delays the assignment process and
maximizes the total number of iterations, as desired. Note
also, that for a complete network topology, ∆ = 1 and the
upper bound on the number of iterations of the distributed
auction algorithm reduces to the one obtained in [22].
The following result characterizes the total benefit
achieved by the distributed auction algorithm in terms of
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the optimal one. In particular, since the networked structure
of the system only affects the underlying information pattern
and not the nature of the assignment procedure, any results
on optimality of solutions obtained by the auction algorithm
[22] apply in the case of the distributed auction algorithm as
well. Hence, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 (Adopted from [22]): The final assignment
α : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m} with α(i) , αi that is
obtained by the distributed auction algorithm is within nǫ
of maximizing the the total assignment benefit.
Proof: Let ǫ > 0 and note that the total benefit of any
assignment α ∈ {1, . . . ,m} satisfies
n∑
i=1
βiα(i) ≤
m∑
j=1
pj +
n∑
i=1
max
1≤j≤m
{βij − pj},
for any set of prices {pj}mj=1, since the second term on the
right-hand-side is no less than
∑n
i=1(βiα(i) − pα(i)), while
the first term is equal to
∑n
i=1 pα(i). Hence, A
⋆ ≤ D⋆, where
A⋆ , max
α(i), i=1,...,n
n∑
i=1
βiα(i)
is the optimal total assignment benefit and
D⋆ , min
pj , j=1,...,m
m∑
j=1
pj +
n∑
i=1
max
1≤j≤m
{βij − pj}.
Since the final assignment and set of prices obtained by
the distributed auction algorithm are almost at equilibrium,
we also have that βiα(i)−pα(i) ≥ max1≤j≤m{βij−pj}− ǫ,
which implies that
D⋆ ≤
n∑
i=1
(
pα(i) + max
1≤j≤m
{βij − pj}
)
≤
n∑
i=1
βiα(i) + nǫ ≤ A
⋆ + nǫ.
Since A⋆ ≤ D⋆, it follows that the total assignment benefit∑n
i=1 βiα(i) is within nǫ of the optimal value A
⋆.
Theorem 3.3 shows that for sufficiently small ǫ, the final
assignment is almost optimal. In particular, if all benefits βij
are integers, the total benefit
∑n
i=1 βiα(i) for any assignment
α is also integer. Hence, if nǫ < 1, an assignment that is
within nǫ of being optimal, must be optimal. We conclude
that if ǫ < 1/n and all benefits are integers, the final
assignment obtained by the distributed auction algorithm
is optimal. This is a straightforward extension of a similar
observation made in [22].
IV. ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE & THE EFFECT
OF THE NETWORK TOPOLOGY
In this section we illustrate the proposed distributed auc-
tion algorithm for different values of the parameter ǫ > 0
and different, but fixed, network topologies G(t) = G. In
particular, for different problem sizes n and same number of
tasks (m = n), we randomly generated benefits βij from
a uniform distribution on the unit interval and compared
the running time and final assignment benefit
∑n
i=1 βiα(i)
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(b) Difference in final assign-
ment benefit (Hungarian minus
Auction) vs. problem size n for
parameter ǫ = .01.
Fig. 3. Comparison of the performance of the distributed auction algorithm
and the Hungarian algorithm for different problem sizes n and a complete
network topology. Observe that small values of ǫ result in slow convergence
of the auction algorithm, while for large ǫ the auction algorithm becomes
faster that the Hungarian. Note also that the final assignment benefit obtained
by the auction algorithm is within nǫ of the optimal one (Theorem 3.3).
obtained by the distributed auction algorithm with the opti-
mal one
∑n
i=1 βiα⋆(i) obtained by the Hungarian algorithm
[21]. The communication topologies considered were the
minimally connected line topology, where every agent is
connected to at most two other agents (Fig. 2), the complete
topology, where every agent is connected to all other agents
in the network, and a random topology, where every agent
is connected to 50% of the other agents so that the resulting
network is connected. All algorithms were implemented
in MATLAB and run on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.40 GHz
processor with 4 GB RAM.
Fig. 3 compares the performance of the distributed auction
algorithm with the Hungarian algorithm for different problem
sizes n, parameters ǫ and the complete network topology.
Observe that the larger ǫ is, the faster the distributed auction
algorithm becomes (Fig. 3(a)). In particular, for sufficiently
large values of ǫ, the auction algorithm becomes significantly
faster than the Hungarian algorithm. This is a reasonable
observation given the upper bound on the running time of
the algorithm obtained in Proposition 3.2. Although large
values of ǫ result in faster convergence, they may also result
in worse performance with respect to the final assignment
benefit
∑n
i=1 βiα(i). Theorem 3.3, however, guarantees that
this final assignment benefit is always within nǫ of the
optimal one. This is illustrated in Fig. 3(b), where the
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Fig. 4. Time (sec) vs. problem size n for different network topologies
and ǫ = .01. Note the slow convergence of the line topology due to the
corresponding maximum network diameter n−1 that dominates complexity.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the performance of the distributed auction algorithm
for different network topologies and parameters ǫ. Observe that the final
assignment depends on the topology of the network, however, for suffi-
ciently small ǫ, the auction algorithm returns an almost optimal solution
(Theorem 3.3) and this effect disappears.
difference in the final assignment benefit
∑n
i=1 βiα⋆(i) −∑n
i=1 βiα(i) obtained by the Hungarian algorithm and the
auction algorithm, respectively, is plotted as a function of
the problem size n for ǫ = .01.
The effect of the network topology on the performance
of the auction algorithm is considered in Figs. 4 and 5. In
particular, Fig. 4 shows how the network topology affects
the running time of the auction algorithm. Observe that
sparse topologies (line topology) are the slowest ones to
converge, as expected by complexity bounds obtained by
Proposition 3.2. On the other hand, the final assignments
obtained for the same problem on different communication
topologies are not necessarily the same (Fig. 5). This is
a reasonable observation given the fact that the network
topology affects the order in which the agents bid for
attractive tasks and for large bid increments, this order may
render tasks unattractive (Fig. 5(a)). Note, however, that the
smaller ǫ becomes, the smaller the bid increments are and the
less the network topology affects the assignment (Fig. 5(b)).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the linear assignment problem
in the context of networked systems, where the main chal-
lenge was dealing with the lack of global information due
to the limited communication capabilities of the agents. We
addressed this challenge by means of a distributed auction
algorithm, where every agent was able to bid for any desired
task. The final assignment was obtained through an appropri-
ate choice of bids that determined the prices of the tasks and
rendered them more or less attractive for the agents to bid for.
Our algorithm consisted an extension to the parallel auction
algorithm proposed by Bertsekas et al, to the case where no
shared memory is available and the agents are required to
store locally all pricing information and update it in a multi-
hop fashion using nearest neighbor agreement protocols.
We showed that our algorithm converges to an assignment
that maximizes the total assignment benefit within a linear
approximation of the optimal one and discussed the effect of
the underlying network topology on its performance.
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